### Question 76

# Of the Union of Body and Soul

Article One: Whether the Intellectual Principle Is United to the Body as its Form?

Obj. 6: The intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form because its form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible remains separate from the body. (PM)

On the Contrary: The intellectual principle is the form of man according to the Philosopher, Metaph. The difference which constitutes man is rational. This is applied to man on account of the intellectual principle.

I answer that: "If anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that it is that this action of understanding in the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands." "Therefore we must asset that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed."

Reply to Obj. 6: "As a light body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and a natural inclination for its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body." In other words, this aptitude and natural inclination continues to be united with the body. (PM)

Article Two: Whether the Intellectual Principle Is Multiplied According to the Number of Bodies?

Obj. 1: "It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one intellect in all men because all men are of one species...Therefore there is but one intellect in all men..."

## Article 2, I answer that

I answer that: "It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men." If there were only one intellect for all men the multiplicity of that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. (PM)

Reply Obj. 1: It impossible for many angels to be of one species because the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike and angel. But by division of matter it requires there are many souls of one species, yet quite the opposite for angels since they are not comprised of matter and therefore, have no body.

Article Three: Whether Besides the Intellectual Soul There Are in Man Other Souls Essentially Different from One Another?

On the Contrary: TA quotes from the book, De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus XV: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and we mingled with the blood, the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason, we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning.

I answer that: Plato and Aristotle differed on their views of how many souls a body can contain. Plato believed to inhabit a body of various parts several souls are necessary in one body. Plato's view is like certain functions and structures of the body need its own soul. But this is not the case since the body is one with one form. Therefore, the body has only one soul. (PM) "Therefore, we conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul...

Article four: Whether in Man There Is another Form Besides the Intellectual Soul?

On the contrary: "Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man." The intellectual soul is one and not two forms of a man.

## Article 4, I answer that

I answer that: Another substantial form of the one man is not found as Plato contended. Since the intellectual soul is united to the body, as its substantial form, as shown in (A, 1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man.

Article Five: Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Properly United to Such a Body?

Obj. one: "Matter must be proportionate to the form, but the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body."

Obj. four: The human body is not endowed as a beast which has its natural clothing and protection. The fact that the human body does not have its own covering it points to a less perfect soul. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect of souls. Therefore, the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the means of protection.

On the contrary: "he Philosopher says (De anima 11, I), that the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially."

I answer that: "Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form...Now the intellectual soul, in the order of nature, is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom, vii). The actions of the senses seem able to perform powers of understanding but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore, it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense...

Reply to Obj. 1: Perhaps one can say that before sin the human body as incorruptible. However, that would overly simply the answer to the question, because the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not

## Article 5, reply to Obj. 1 cont.

consider what God might do, but what is suitable to the nature of things...God provided a remedy against death in the gift of grace."

Reply to Obj. 4: "The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing...since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes..."

Article Eight: Whether the Whole Soul Is in Each Part of the Body?

Obj. 4: "Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body." This is not possible. (PM)

On the contrary: "Augustine says (De Trin. Vi. 6), that in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire."

I answer that: Since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must be in all parts of the body, both in part and in whole. (PM)

Reply to Obj. 4: The soul is only in that part of the body which is adapted to the operation of such a power...for some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely, the intellect and body. (PM)

### Questions and Answers for Question 76

1. Is the intellectual principle united to the body as its form? "If anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that it is that this action of understanding in the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands." "Therefore we must asset that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed."

### Q & A Question 76 cont.

- 2. Is the intellectual principle multiplied according to the number of bodies? "It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men." If there were only one intellect for all men the multiplicity of that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. (PM)
- 3. Besides the intellectual soul in man are there other souls essentially different from one another? Plato and Aristotle differed on their views of how many souls a body can contain. Plato believed to inhabit a body of various parts several souls are necessary in one body.. Plato's view is like certain functions and structures of the body need its own soul. But this is not the case since the body is one with one form. Therefore, the body has only one soul. (PM) "Therefore, we conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul...
- 4. Is there in man another form besides the intellectual soul? Another substantial form of the one man is not found as Plato contended. Since the intellectual soul is united to the body, as its substantial form, as shown in (A, 1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man.
- 5. Is the intellectual soul properly united to this body? " soul, in the order of nature, is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom, vii). The actions of the senses seem able to perform powers of understanding but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore, it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense...

### Question 77

## Of Those Things Which Belong to the Powers of the Soul in General

Article Two: Whether There Are Several Powers of the Soul?

I answer that: "Man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude...Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. " The philosopher, De Coelo 2:12 indicates that the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they can acquire some measure of goodness by few movements. The fewer the movements the higher the ability to acquire universal and perfect goodness and the conclusion is that things which are below man acquire a limited goodness and they have a few operations and powers. To angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient and in God there exists no power or action beyond his essence. (PM) "There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers;--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul."

Article Eight: Whether All the Powers Remain in the Soul When Separated from the Body?

I answer that: "All the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject, as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. ..Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually, but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root..."

#### Q & A for Question 77

1. Are there several powers of the soul? Yes, "Man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude...Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. " The philosopher, De Coelo 2:12 indicates that the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they can acquire

## Q & A Question 77 question # 1 cont.

a measure of goodness by few movements. The fewer the movements the higher the ability to acquire universal and perfect goodness and the conclusion is that things which are below man acquire a limited goodness and they have a few operations and powers. To angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient and in God there exists no power or action beyond his essence. (PM) "There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers;--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul."

2. Is the whole soul in each part of the body? These powers must remain in the soul after the destruction of the body: Those in principle, but not in subject. The intelligence and the will remain in the soul after death of the body.

#### Question 78

# Of the Specific Powers of the Soul

Article One: Whether There Are to Be Distinguished Five Genera of Powers in the Soul?

On the contrary: "The Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 3). The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive, and the intellectual.

I answer that: "The five genera of powers of the soul are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive, and the intellectual. The rational soul does not operate through a corporeal quality, but the sensitive soul does operate through the body in terms of the senses. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal quality...Every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the vegetative soul; for digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of heat."

## Question 78 Article One, I answer that cont.

"The powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects. The higher the power the more universal it extends. The soul's operation may be considered in triple order. In the soul the vegetative operates on the body that is united to the soul. Another power is the sensitive which regards a more universal object—namely, not only the sensible body, not only the body to which the soul isunited. The third genus in the powers of the soul is the rational which regards still more universal object—namely, not only the sensible body, but all being in universal. The latter two genera of soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. This extrinsic factor is the object of the soul's operation. It must be related to the soul in two ways. One, something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In like manner there are two kinds of powers--, the sensitive in regard to the less common object –the sensible body; and the intellectual, in regard to the most common object—universal being. Two, in regards to soul having an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic, there are two powers—the appetitive operating to an end which is the first intention and the locomotive referring to something extrinsic in terms of its operation and movement. This is so because every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions." TA

"The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things." There are some vegetative living things in which there exists only vegetative power such as plants. There also exists some sensitive, but not locomotive power such as shellfish. "There are some animals which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance." TA

Men and women have intellectual power. PM "Now the appetitive power does manifest living qualities because the soul's two highest powers are the intellectual and the sensory. The Soul is related to things outside it in two fundamental ways which are always found together, (1) the cognitive and (2) the appetitive. Both on the sensory level (A) and on the intellectual level (B), the soul both (1)

## Question 78 Article One cont

"receives" (it) the forms of things outside it, thus "knowing" (it) them by being informed . ("in-forma-ation"), and (2) moves to them, "desires" (it) them as its end. Thus we have (AI) sensory awareness, (A2) sensory appetite, (B1) intellectual awareness, and (B2) intellectual appetite (will). PK

### Q & A for Question 78

1. Are there really Five Genera of Powers in the Soul? Yes, there are five genera of powers of the soul, as numbered above. "The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways, for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its matter and instrument. " (See the summary supplied)