

A. Happiness

Question 1

Of Man's Last End

Human life is consisting of happiness in the end. That is real blessedness and not just a subjective contentment, or being at rest. This is the objective good for mankind. It is contentment in the sense of true good.

Article One: Whether It Belongs to Man to Act for an End?

Obj. one: Man does not act for an end, but for a cause first. But the idea of man's end pertains to what is last. Causality is the issue and not for man to act for an end.

I answer that: Man is the master of his actions. The free-will is defined as the *faculty and will of reason*. Human actions are from a deliberate will. Now "whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end." (TA)

Reply Obj. one: "Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way that it is a cause..." (TA)

Article Two: Whether It Is Proper to the Rational Nature [Alone] to Act for an End?

On the contrary: The Philosopher proves (*Phys*, ii. 5) that *not only mind but also nature acts for an end.*"

I answer that: "Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. " Nothing moves without an end from intention. For actions are caused by intentions. Intentions have to do with certitude. Natural inclination is the natural appetite which causes will to act. The rational nature, by the rational appetite is called the will. There are two ways that a thing tends to an end by its action or movement to the end. One is as a thing, moving itself to the end,--and two as a thing moved by another to the end. These movements are typically by the *faculty of will and reason*. But those things that lack another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent. (PM) and (TA) "Man knows the good rationally and in general, and therefore has free will to choose among particular goods. " (PK) Creatures without reason move in the way they were created to their end. Irrational creatures tend to an end directed or led by another, but do not comprehend the outcome. They just move to the end of their instincts. They do not fast. They eat when they are hungry. (PM)

Question 1 Third Article

Article Three: Whether Human Acts Are Specified by Their End?

Obj. one: "It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end..."

On the contrary: Augustine says (*De Mor, Eccl. Et Manich*, ii. 13): *According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy of blame or praise.*"

I answer that: Moral acts are the same as human acts. Human acts proceed to an end in sight. Moral acts proceed from the object of the will. "Now the object of the will is the good and the end. Ambrose says that morality is said properly of man, moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end.

Reply Obj. 1: "The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and it is just this that is essential to an act, viz., to proceed from something and to proceed towards something."

Article Four: Whether There Is One Last End of Human Life:

On the contrary: The Philosopher says (*Metaph*, ii. 2) "that to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good. But the good is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one last end: "

I answer that: "Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also." There would be no first mover if causes were to continue into eternity with endless movement. Because without which neither can the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Thus, the order of intention and the order of execution require that something must be first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. If there were no last end, nothing would be desired."

Article Five: Whether One Man Can Have Several Last Ends?

On the contrary: In order to be single minded we have only one last end. Matt. 6:4 "No Man can serve two masters."

I answer that: "It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things. For in the end comes the complete or the perfect. ..It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite. Nothing is left besides it for man to desire, which is not possible, if something else is required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as

Article Five I answer that cont.

though each were its perfect good... Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.”

Article six: Whether Man Wills All, Whatsoever He Wills, for the Last End?

Obj. one: “It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end.”

Obj. two: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* (i. 2) that speculative science is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end.”

Obj. three: “Further, whoever ordains something to an end thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.

On the contrary: Augustine says (De Civ, Dei xix. 1): *That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love it for its own sake.*”

I answer that: “Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. “ Two reasons are given: 1. Because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. 2. Because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.”

Reply to Obj. one: “Man’s consummate good is his last end. “ Jesting actions are not directed to any external end, but merely to the good of the jester. (PM)

Reply to Obj. two: “The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist’s good, included in complete and perfect good, which is the ultimate end.”

Reply to Obj. three: While walking down a road one knows there is an end in mind, but one does not need to be thinking of that end with every step.

Article Seven: Whether All Men Have the Same Last End?

Obj. one: All men do not have the same last end for some sin and some are on the road to being and doing good which leads to a better end.

Obj. two: Various pursuits in people’s lives lead to different ends so they do not have the same ends.

Obj. three: People have different things in their pursuits so they don’t have the same last end.

Article Seven I answer that

I answer that: “We can speak of the last end in two ways: 1. Considering the formal aspect only of the last end. 2. We can consider the content in which the aspect of the last end is the other. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well-disposed affections desires for his last end. (TA) “Thus the good for man is (1) relative and different for different people with regard to its particular content (some desire riches, some wisdom...(2) absolute and the same for all in its essential form all desire happiness), and (3) absolute also with regard to the right content, what is truly best for all (God). TA would answer the typically modern relativist’s challenge to (3)—“Who’s to judge?”—by saying the wise man, with healthy desires, is the rightful judge. Therefore if your desires are not well ordered, you are not just as qualified to judge as he is, you imply you are with your rhetorical question “Who’s to judge?”

Reply Obj. one: “Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.”

Reply Obj. two: “Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.”

Reply Obj. three: “Although actions are of individual, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above (A.5)...”

Questions and Answers for Articles 1-7 for Question One on Ethics

1. Does it seem proper for Man to act for an End? Man is the master of his actions. The free-will is defined as the faculty and will of reason. Human actions are from a deliberate will. Now “whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.” (TA)

2. Is it proper to the rational nature alone to act for an end? “Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. “ Nothing moves without an end from intention. For actions are caused by intentions. Intentions have to do with certitude. Natural inclination is the natural appetite which causes will to act. The rational nature, by the rational appetite is called the will. There are two ways that a thing tends to an end by its action or movement to the end. One is as a thing, moving itself to the end,—and two as a thing moved by another to the end. These movements are typically by the faculty of will and reason. But those things that lack another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent. (PM) and (TA) “Man knows the good rationally and in general, and therefore has free will to choose among particular goods. “ (PK) Creatures without reason move in the way they were created to their end.

Q & A Question # 2 cont.

Irrational creatures tend to an end directed or led by another, but do not comprehend the outcome. They just move to the end of their instincts. They do not fast. They eat when they are hungry. (PM)

3. Are human acts specified by their end? Moral acts are the same as human acts. Human acts proceed to an end in sight. Moral acts proceed from the object of the will. "Now the object of the will is the good and the end. Ambrose says that morality is said properly of man, moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end.

4. Is there one last end of human life? "Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also." There would be no first mover if causes were to continue into eternity with endless movement. Because without which neither can the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Thus, the order of intention and the order of execution require that something must be first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. If there were no last end, nothing would be desired."

5. Can one man have several last ends? "It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things. For in the end comes the complete or the perfect. ..It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite. Nothing is left besides it for man to desire, which is not possible, if something else is required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good... Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end."

6. Does man will all and whatsoever he wills is it for the last end? "Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. " Two reasons are given: 1. Because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. 2. Because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end."

7. Do all men have the same last end? "We can speak of the last end in two ways: 1. Considering the formal aspect only of the last end. 2. We can consider the content in which the aspect of the last end is the other. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well-disposed affections desires for his last end. (TA) "Thus the good for man is (1) relative and different for different people with regard to its particular content (some desire riches, some wisdom...(2) absolute and the same for all in its essential form all desire happiness), and (3) absolute also with regard to the right content, what is truly best for all (God). TA would answer the typically modern relativist's challenge to (3)—"Who's to judge?"—by saying the wise man, with healthy desires, is the rightful judge. Therefore if your desires are not well ordered, you are not just as qualified to judge as he is, you imply you are with your rhetorical question "Who's to judge?"